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FORT LOUDOUN: BRITISH STRONGHOLD IN THE TENNESSEE COUNTRY

By JAMES C. KELLY

The Cherokee Indians occupied a very strategic position during the long struggle between Great Britain and France for mastery of North America. Controlled by the French, the Cherokee nation would serve as a staging ground for raids against the British settlements in Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia. Controlled by the British, the Cherokee would be a buffer against depredations by the French and their Indian allies. This was understood clearly by the South Carolina Assembly, which resolved that "the safety of this Province, under God, does depend on the friendship of the Cherokees."¹

The idea of building a British fort among the Cherokee as a means of controlling them was proposed as early as 1708, but nothing was done until James Glen was appointed Royal Governor of South Carolina in 1743. Glen was an avid proponent of the fort, and he frequently asked the Cherokee to allow him to build one in their nation.²

Although the Cherokee had signed a treaty of friendship and commerce with Great Britain in 1730, they were ambivalent about having a British fort in their territory. On the one hand it would better insure a regular supply of trade goods, arms, and ammunition, upon which the Indians had come to depend, and which the British could furnish in greater quantity and at cheaper prices than the French. A fort would also be a secure haven for Cherokee women and children when the warriors were away hunting or at war. On the other hand, the

¹ Thomas Cooper and David McCord, eds., *Statutes at Large of South Carolina* (4 vols., Columbia, S. C., 1838-41), III, 39.

² Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Durham, N.C., 1929), 93. For efforts to build a fort 1708-43, see 89-90, 94-95, 191-92, 220, 228-34, 276. Also David Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740-62* (Norman, Okla., 1962), 20. Also, Philip Hamer, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Cherokee Country, 1754-57," *North Carolina Historical Review*, II (1925), 304. Also, John R. Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier: A Study of Indian Relations, War, Trade, and Land Problems in the Southern Wilderness, 1754-1775* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1944), 32. Corkran, Hamer, and Alden each contain an excellent overview of Anglo-Cherokee relations during the Fort Loudoun period.

Indians feared that it would compromise their independence, as indeed the British intended that it would.³

There were three principal areas of Cherokee settlement: the Lower Towns in upper South Carolina, the Middle Settlements in extreme southwestern North Carolina, and the Overhill Towns, so-called because they lay across the Appalachian Mountains, in what is today Tennessee. In 1747 the Overhill Cherokee invited the British to build a fort near their towns. They were not unaware of the possible danger, but they saw a certain and compensating advantage in having a fort. They were making a bid for supremacy over the other two regions, and they calculated that having direct contact with the British — the source of trade and armaments — would enhance their chance of gaining hegemony in the Cherokee nation.⁴

Having obtained the Cherokee's consent to build a fort, Governor Glen approached his legislature for funds, without success. He turned to the Board of Trade in London, which endorsed his proposal and directed him to buy land for the fort and submit a plan of the fort to them and an estimate of its expense. Glen complied, but when the war with France ended in 1748 the imperial government in London lost interest and nothing was done.⁵

³ Glen to Lords of Trade, July 15, 1750, South Carolina Public Records, I, 44, states that a fort would be "a bridle in the mouths of our Indians." I have used transcripts of these papers in the McClung Historical Collection at Knoxville, Tennessee. The volume and page numbers refer to these transcripts, not to the original papers in Columbia, which are numbered differently. Hereinafter cited as SCPR. Glen to Lords of Trade, July 27, 1752, SCPR, I, 85, reads in part: "it [a fort] would enable us immediately to curb their insolencies [*sic*] and prevent things coming to a head."

⁴ Glen to Lords of Trade, September 27, 1746, April 28, 1747, British Public Record Office, Colonial Office (hereinafter cited as C.O.), 5/371, and Glen to Lords of Trade, December —, 1751, C.O., 5/373, cited in Alden, *John Stuart*, 32; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 20; *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, Colonial Series (6 vols.; Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966), IV, 48 (hereinafter cited as *Privy Council*) notes that Glen's proposal for a fort had the Cherokee's approval. For the Overhills' bid for supremacy see Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, *passim*. A different interpretation appears in John Philip Reid, *A Law of Blood: The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation* (New York, 1970), 17-27.

⁵ Alden, *John Stuart*, 34, says that funds were not voted because of a coincident quarrel over prerogative power. In Glen to Lords of Trade, July 26, 1748, SCPR, I, 24-25, Glen states that the Council and Assembly urged him to promise the Cherokee a fort, but then voted only £200 to begin it. In *Privy Council*, IV, 48, Glen is directed to procure land for a fort and to submit a plan and estimate of expenses. Glen to Lords of Trade, October 10, 1748, SCPR, I, 32, acknowledges receipt of approval of a fort, "which I have long had at heart." Glen to Lords of Trade, July 15, 1750, SCPR, I, 42, says that land has been procured and estimates the cost at \$2500-3000. The Board of Trade referred this to the Duke of Bedford, who as secretary of state for the Southern Department, ignored it. Subsequent appeals to revive the project are in Glen to Lords of Trade, July 27, 1752, July 30, 1753, SCPR, I, 85, 97, and Charles Pinckney to Lords of Trade, June 1, 1754, SCPR, I, 100.

Only in 1754, with another round of fighting imminent, was the project revived. His Majesty's Government sent £10,000 to Lieutenant-Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia for the defense of the American frontier, with an order that an unspecified portion of it be applied to building a fort in the upper Cherokee country. Glen applied for £7,000 to build the fort, but Dinwiddie sent only £1,000 and a letter saying that Glen's estimate was too high, and suggesting that South Carolina, which enjoyed a monopoly on trade with the Cherokee, foot the rest of the bill. Glen lowered his estimate by a third, but got nothing more from Dinwiddie, who spent the balance of his funds on Edward Braddock's ill-fated expedition into the wilderness.⁶

Glen was forced to turn to his own parsimonious legislature. By March, 1756, nothing had been done. The Overhill Cherokee, disgusted by Glen's delays, approached Virginia directly. As it happened, the defeat of Braddock had left Virginia vulnerable to French attacks. Dinwiddie desperately needed Cherokee warriors to help defend his frontiers, so he arranged for 600 braves to go to Virginia when the colony built a fort in the Overhills.⁷

Dinwiddie appointed Major Andrew Lewis to raise sixty men, including "many tradesmen that can use the Saw and Ax." On June 28, 1756, Lewis and party arrived at Chota, the principal Cherokee town and aspiring national capital.⁸

The agreement between Virginia and the Cherokee only required the Virginians "to assist in the building (of) a fort," because Dinwiddie anticipated, or at least hoped, that when Lewis arrived in the

⁶ Lord Halifax's "Proposals for building Forts & c: upon the Ohio, & Other Rivers in North America, April 30th, 1754," C.O., 5/6, and Lords of Trade to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 20, 1754, C.O., 5/386, and Robinson to Dinwiddie, July 5, 1754, C.O., 5/11, cited in Alden, *John Stuart*, 39; Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, January 23, 1756, SCPR, I, 172-74. For correspondence about Glen's quarrel with Dinwiddie over the financing of the fort, see R.A. Brock, *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie* (2 vols., Richmond, Va., 1883-84), I, 369, 379, 382, 484-88, 508, and II, 24, 26, 28, 214.

⁷ Talk of Chucununta, January 12, 1756, SCPR, I, 171; Journal of Commons House of Assembly, January 23, 1756, SCPR, I, 172-74. The agreement between Virginia and the Cherokee appears in "The Indian Treaty of 1756," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, XIII, no. 3 (January, 1906), 250-62.

⁸ H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Journal of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1752-55, 1757-58* (Richmond, Va., 1909), 372; Dinwiddie to Lewis, April 14, 1756, in Brock, *Dinwiddie*, II, 389; Lewis to Raymond Demeré, July 7, 1756, in William McDowell, ed., *Colonial Records of South Carolina*, series 2, *Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, 1754-1765* (Columbia, S.C., 1970), 138. Hereinafter cited as CRSC. This volume contains the "Indian Books of South Carolina" for 1756-60, the greatest single source on Fort Loudoun.

Overhills Glen's fort-building expedition from South Carolina would already be there. Glen's men were not there, so Lewis built a fort on his own.⁹

Within six weeks Lewis completed a fort on the west bank of the Little Tennessee River, across the river from Chota. The fort was a square 105 feet on a side. It consisted of an earthen wall four feet thick but only two feet high, with a log palisade wall on top of the earthen wall, rising seven feet above it. A ditch surrounded the fort. From the bottom of the ditch to the top of the palisade measured sixteen feet.¹⁰

Major Lewis prepared to return to Virginia with the promised 600 warriors, but the Cherokee raised the price of their assistance. They wanted at least a company of Virginians to garrison the fort. Dinwiddie, who regarded the fort merely as a place of refuge, never intended to garrison it. Lewis said the South Carolinians would garrison it, but the Cherokee said no. They now wanted two forts — the Virginia fort to intercept their enemies who came by land, and a South Carolina fort to intercept those who came by water. To get the promised warriors, Dinwiddie considered sending a small garrison, but in the end sent none. Fearing that the French might occupy the ungarrisoned and unnamed fort, the Cherokee destroyed it not long after it was finished.¹¹

Governor Glen, having finally obtained sufficient funds to build a fort, set out from Charleston about the time Lewis was departing Virginia. Glen was accompanied by Captain Raymond Demeré, "an officer of winning personality," and the eighty British regulars of his Independent Company of Charleston. These red-coated troops would garrison the fort Glen was going to build. To do the actual construction, two provincial militia companies of sixty men each were enlisted, and ordered to meet Glen and Demeré at Fort Prince George in upper South Carolina.¹²

⁹ "The Indian Treaty of 1756," 255; Dinwiddie to Lewis, April 14, 1756, and Dinwiddie to Shirley, April 28, 1756, in Brock, *Dinwiddie*, II, 390, 396.

¹⁰ Lewis to Dinwiddie, July 23, 1756, and Old Hop to Dinwiddie, July 23, 1756, in Louis K. Koontz, *Robert Dinwiddie: Correspondence Illustrative of His Career in American Colonial Government and Western Expansion* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), 1029, 1031; Demeré to Lyttelton, July 10 and 30, 1756, *CRSC*, 132, 151; Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, August 11, 1756, *SCPR*, I, 237.

¹¹ The voluminous correspondence about garrisoning the fort appears in *CRSC*, 132-33, 141, 167-78, 201, 217; Koontz, *Dinwiddie*, 1032-33, 1113; Brock, *Dinwiddie*, II, 486-87, 510, 512, 533, 536, 539, 561, 603, 657. Minute of the Virginia Council, January 24, 1758, C.O., 5/1429 (Library of Congress transcripts).

¹² Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, July 19, 1756, *SCPR*, I, 225; John P. Brown, *Old Frontiers* (Kingsport, Tenn., 1938), 62. This account contains a detailed account of Anglo-

At Fort Ninety-Six, Glen was recalled to Charleston by a letter from William Henry Lyttelton, who had been appointed to succeed Glen as governor, and who had arrived in Charleston since Glen's departure. Lyttelton disbanded the provincials, and ordered Deméré on to Fort Prince George to await further orders while the new governor reviewed the entire project.¹³ This delay prevented the South Carolina fort-building expedition from making a rendezvous with the one from Virginia.

Because he had no political enemies in South Carolina as yet, Lyttelton was able to obtain a more generous appropriation for the fort than Glen had received. The new governor and his council also met with John William Gerard DeBrahm, the expedition's engineer, who had served the Hapsburg Emperor Charles VI, and migrated to Georgia in 1751. DeBrahm was given broad discretionary power in designing the fort, but contrary to DeBrahm's wishes the council expressed a preference for "low works," which they said were "more agreeable to the practice of modern engineers."¹⁴

DeBrahm joined Deméré at Fort Prince George on August 24, 1756. Two days later the re-formed provincial militia companies arrived there also. On September 21 the expedition—200 men strong—left the fort and ten days later arrived at the Cherokee town of Tomatley. All of the leading chiefs and 200 warriors, painted and finely dressed, greeted them. By now the Cherokee realized that probably Virginia would not garrison her already abandoned fort. Being told that the Carolinians had come not only to build a fort, but to garrison it, the Cherokee were jubilant. Near the town of Tuskegee the "English Camp Tennesy River" was established.¹⁵

Three days later a party including Deméré, DeBrahm, and the Cherokee chiefs Old Hop and Attakullakulla went to inspect the site chosen for the fort by Ensign John Pearson, whom Glen had sent to the

Cherokee relations during the period of Fort Loudoun. For Glen's difficulties in securing funds for the fort, see Alden, *John Stuart*, 47-49, 57-58; *Journal of Council*, April 8, 1756, SCPR, I, 180; Glen to Lords of Trade, April 14, 1756, SCPR, I, 189.

¹³ Executive Journals of the South Carolina Council, 1756-62, for June 2, 1756. I have used a bound volume of transcripts of these journals in the McClung Historical Collection, Knoxville. Hereinafter cited as SCCJ. Deméré to Lyttelton, June 9, 1756, CRSC, 118.

¹⁴ Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, June 19, 1756, SCPR, I, 205-8; Alden, *John Stuart*, 58; Hamer, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 314. *Privy Council*, IV, 364, states the actual cost of Fort Loudoun as £7000. For DeBrahm, see Samuel C. Williams, *Early Travels in the Tennessee Country, 1540-1800* (Johnson City, Tenn., 1928), 187-88. On "low works," SCCJ, July 29, 1756, pp. 13-14.

¹⁵ Deméré to Lyttelton, October 13, 1756, CRSC, 214-18.

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
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Cherokee country in February. DeBrahm objected that the site was commanded by three hills, which it was, although only substantial artillery on those hills could have threatened it. The site was adequate against Indian attacks, but as it was built to resist the French, DeBrahm's objection was well founded. Demeré, however, believed that DeBrahm's complaint "was more for contradiction's sake than any Thing else." DeBrahm selected a site a mile farther on where the river formed a natural fortress, but the chiefs assured him "they were not in the least danger of any Enemy that should attempt to come that far by water as nothing but Cannoes could come."¹⁶

Demeré thought DeBrahm's spot was "a very dismal Place and a Kind of a Desert." He complained that there was no planting ground where the men could grow food, but he added that DeBrahm was empowered to choose whatever site he pleased. Nonetheless, in Captain Demeré's words, DeBrahm "took one of his Pistols from the Holster and offering it to me told me to shoot him in the Head; this he spoke with such Passion and Fury the like was never seen. I told him he might Blow up his Brains himself if he would." It was not an auspicious beginning between the commander and the engineer. DeBrahm was a capable engineer, but deserved being called by one contemporary "A Madman truly."¹⁷

A compromise was reached which partially satisfied the Cherokee and DeBrahm, but left Demeré disgusted. The site selected was on the south side of the Little Tennessee River above the mouth of the Tellico River. It was near Pearson's site, but the fort was to be built into the side of one of the hills which DeBrahm claimed commanded that site. By building the fort on the hill DeBrahm proposed to eliminate any danger from that eminence while separating the fort by the maximum distance from the other hills and gaining a panoramic and controlling

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; Pearson's criteria appear in Glen to Carpenter (Attakullakulla), February 17, 1756, *CRSC*, 99-100; *SCCJ*, 1756, pp. 68-72, 147. DeBrahm's preferred site was Rose Island, according to Alberta and Carson Brewer, *Valley So Wild: A Folk History* (Knoxville, 1975), 33. For Attakullakulla, see James C. Kelly, "Attakullakulla," *Journal of Cherokee Studies*, III, no. 1 (Winter, 1978), 3-34.

¹⁷ Demeré to Lyttelton, October 13, 1756, *CRSC*, 217. DeBrahm's version appears in "De Brahms Account," Williams, *Early Travels*, 189-94. Review of *Oak from an Acorn: A History of the American Philosophical Society Library 1770-1803*, in *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, CI, no. 3 (July, 1977), 393.

at the site was substantial artillery. DeBrahm's fort was adequate for the purpose. DeBrahm's fort was "by no means a Thing else." The river formed a natural barrier not in the least far by water as

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view of the river,¹⁸ up which he unrealistically expected the French to come in bateaux.

DeBrahm designed a European-style fort much more elaborate than typical frontier forts like the Virginia fort across the river. His fort was diamond-shaped with a bastion projecting from each corner. The bastions were named for the King, Queen, Prince of Wales, and Duke of Cumberland. Only two of the bastions were on the crest of the hill. Because the hill was not large enough for the entire fort, the rest of it occupied the southern slope of the ridge and an adjacent meadow of low land near the river. In all the fort enclosed about two acres.

Each side of DeBrahm's fort was 300 feet long. Outside the projected walls a dry moat or ditch would be dug a yard deep and ten feet across in which would be planted a hedge of honey locusts with thorns three to four inches long. This was "to render the fort impregnable at least against Indians who always engage naked." The dirt excavated from the ditch would be used to build the fort's walls — an earthen breastwork or parapet twenty-one feet thick at the base and sloping upward to a height of about four feet. Outside the main polygon of the fort, near the river, DeBrahm planned to build elaborate outer works which he called Glen's Fort and Lyttelton's Ravelin.¹⁹

On October 13 Demeré asked Lyttelton "to send a name for the fort when built," adding, "was this left to me I should be at no loss for a Name." Prudence, modesty, or both, dissuaded the Governor from allowing Demeré to act on this broad hint. Instead Lyttelton sent the name Fort Loudoun in honor of the Earl of Loudoun, who had arrived in America in July, 1756 to assume the position of commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America.²⁰

Work on the fort got underway quickly but not without problems as great ill will already existed between DeBrahm and Demeré. On October 28, however, when news of an imminent French attack arrived, the two men laid aside their quarrel and agreed to quickly erect a palisade because the earthworks were not yet sufficient to offer any protection.²¹

¹⁸ Demeré to Lyttelton, November 7, 1756, *CRSC*, 241; Donald Davidson, *The Tennessee, The Old River: Frontier to Secession* (New York, 1946), 103.

¹⁹ "De Brahms Account," 192; Davidson, *The Tennessee*, 104.

²⁰ Demeré to Lyttelton, October 13, 1756, *CRSC*, 219. It is first referred to as Fort Loudoun in a document dated December 5, 1756.

²¹ Demeré to Lyttelton, October 28 and November 25, 1756, *ibid.*, 232-33, 260.

When the palisade was finished DeBrahm inexplicably began to build a second palisade around the first one. Demeré could make no sense of it. On November 7 he wrote to Lyttelton, "We are now nothing but Pallisadoes." Indeed, Demeré thought DeBrahm's entire plan was too grandiose. He pressed for a return to Ensign Pearson's level site, adding, "we should then have had no occasion to blow up rocks nor to build Ravleens, Fort-glens, and Counter Guards by the Waterside as if the River was navigable for Men of War."²²

DeBrahm and Demeré also disagreed on how many men should work on the fort. Demeré met his engineer more than half way, dispensing with his daytime guards, but even so DeBrahm wanted a hundred more workmen. DeBrahm always claimed to have special instructions or intelligence from Governor Lyttelton, Lord Loudoun, or some other luminary, which Demeré correctly regarded as "little more than a sound of words." So poisoned were relations between the two men that DeBrahm moved into Tomatley and issued his orders-of-the-day from there. He would not speak to Demeré.²³

In mid-December DeBrahm announced that as the fort was nearing completion he would soon discharge the provincials and they would not be paid thereafter. Demeré retorted that as the commander of the expedition only he could discharge the men. Unsure which man had the power to cut off their pay, the soldiers were divided into factions. The next morning the three companies were paraded under arms, read the articles of war, and admonished against insubordination. One private who was misled by DeBrahm into speaking mutinously received 200 lashes with the cat-of-nine-tails.²⁴

On December 22 DeBrahm sent "final instructions" for completing the fort, which he estimated would take three days. "He means three months," commented one sergeant. Demeré sent the engineer a blistering reply:

Can you call this a Fort, no Guns or Platforms, no Barracks, no Guard, no necessary Houses or Drains . . . no Houses for the officers but miserable huts built at their own Expences . . . no store Houses . . . and in short nothing as yet to seem deserving the Name of a Fort. The out works you say are so near finished are no way defensible. The

²² Demeré to Lyttelton, November 7 and 18, 1756, *ibid.*, 240, 250.

²³ Demeré to Lyttelton, October 16, November 18 and 25, 1756, *ibid.*, 225, 250, 261.

²⁴ Demeré to Lyttelton, December 16 and 23, 1756, and Council of War, December 16, 1756, and Court Martial of Henry Hammon, *ibid.*, 272-75, 281.

Breastworks in some places not being three feet high, and nothing but the Pallisadoes can hinder a Man galloping in to the fort a Horse back, and after the vast labour and expence bestowed on the Place called Glen's Fort, it is at last to be abandoned and left unfinished.²⁵

DeBrahm refused to read Demeré's letter and on Christmas the engineer left for Charleston. The Cherokee dubbed him "the warrior who ran away in the night." They derided his fort too. "The Indians call it the Fort to put Horses, Cows and Hogs in," Demeré reported to Lyttelton, "but I differ in opinion with them for it would not be sufficient."²⁶

A council of officers decided that the unfinished works should be occupied and promptly put into a defensible condition. By January 2, 1757 all the men were living in the fort, each company having built its own huts. They constructed drains and a latrine, troughs (perhaps from hollowed-out logs) to salt beef in, and a house to store the meat in. A pit was dug to burn charcoal for the blacksmith.²⁷

Demeré decided to "forsake Mr. DeBrahm's outer works, being of no service or signification, rather more prejudicial than otherwise, and to proceed immediately with cutting large and substantial pallisadoes fifteen feet long and to put them round the whole fort close to the breastworks above which they are to project eight feet." This new row of palisades was needed because the two inner palisades had been built hastily and were not firmly implanted in the earth. The logs felled for palisades were hauled to the fort in three two-wheeled carts. The pointed palisade logs were set just inside the parapet and were angled outward by fifteen degrees for better defense. Loopholes were cut at proper places in the palisade wall to permit firing.²⁸

By March 1, 1757, two of the walls and two of the bastions were finished. On March 26 soldiers completed the remaining walls and bastions. Two strong gates were built, one facing the river, the other probably facing the Cherokee towns to the south. Then Demeré wrote to Lyttelton that DeBrahm's two inner palisades must come down, "for

²⁵ Demeré to Lyttelton, December 23, 1756, and Demeré and Other Officers to DeBrahm, December 23, 1756, and Survey of Fort Loudoun By Order of Captain Rayd. Demeré, *ibid.*, 284-86; Brown, *Old Frontiers*, 72.

²⁶ Demeré to DeBrahm, December 25, 1756, and Demeré to Lyttelton, December 27, 1756, and January 2, 1757, *ibid.*, 286-89, 301-2.

²⁷ Council of War, December 26, 1756, and Demeré to Lyttelton, January 2, 1757, *ibid.*, 287, 302.

²⁸ Demeré to Lyttelton, January 31 and March 1, 1757, *ibid.*, 326, 345.

they will be of no service to us, nor were they ever any. They only crowded the people."²⁹ Demeré exaggerated because, though weak and hastily built, they had served in a perceived though imagined emergency, and Demeré had approved of the first palisade's being built.

When the palisade was completed, three cannon, weighing upward of three hundred pounds each, were mounted on "pretty high platforms in each bastion." Demeré had left the cannon at Fort Prince George because he doubted that they could be brought across the mountains. He contracted the job to the enterprising trader John Elliot who "contrived to poise on each horse a canon cross ways over the pack saddle, and lashed them round the horse's body with belts; but as these horses had to cross a country full of high mountains, and these covered with forrests, it would happen that sometimes one end of a canon would catch a tree, twist upon the saddle, and draw the horse down, some of which had by these accidents their backs broken under the weight, and lost their lives."³⁰

The cannon arrived nailed up with hardened steel spikes and had to be placed in a large fire until red hot to soften the steel so they could be drilled out. "The Indians are very pleased with them," reported Demeré, "and the very name of our Great Guns will be a terror to the French if they shou'd come and particularly to their Indians for they could never expect that we shou'd have brought a Train of Artillery from such a distance and over such prodigious mountains."³¹

Demeré was justly proud of what he had accomplished since the precipitate departure of his engineer, but was chagrined to receive a reproving letter from Lyttelton in early April directing him to adhere to and complete DeBrahm's plan. Since his return to Charleston the engineer apparently had gotten the governor's ear. Actually, Demeré had not departed significantly from DeBrahm's plans. He had "forsaken" the outer works, but was able to show that the engineer himself had abandoned those works. DeBrahm's plan for Glen's Fort

²⁹ Demeré to Lyttelton, March 1 and 26, 1757, *ibid.*, 345, 347.

³⁰ Demeré to Lyttelton, January 31, 1757, *ibid.*, 326; "De Brahm's Account," 192. Demeré to Lyttelton, November 25, 1756, *CRSC*, 259, says twelve cannon were received. After Fort Loudoun fell, the cannon were taken to Chota, according to Draper MS. 2-D-1-21 (Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison). Henry Timberlake notes two of them being fired at Chota, in Samuel C. Williams, ed., *Lieutenant Henry Timberlake's Memoirs, 1756-1765* (Johnson City, Tenn., 1927, from the original London, 1765 edition), 118. One of these cannon now belongs to the Fort Loudoun Association; another is in private hands.

³¹ Demeré to Lyttelton, November 28, December 23 and 27, 1756, *CRSC*, 260, 282, 287; Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, December 25, 1756, *SCPR*, I, 265.

was to level off the slope of the hill running from the fort to the river by scooping out the top of the hill and using it to fill in the bottom of the hill. This involved moving staggering quantities of earth and Demeré presumed, probably correctly, that the omission of these outer works from DeBrahm's "final instructions" meant that even the engineer saw the futility of pursuing them.³²

On July 30, 1757, Demeré reported that "our fort is entirely completed and in a posture of defense." One hundred men had worked on it for ten months. Raymond Demeré had completed his task. "I am sickly and infirm," he wrote to Lyttelton, "I beg your Excellency may send me a successor." The successor arrived on August 6, and he was no stranger to the commander. On August 14 Raymond Demeré "had the garrison under arms and delivered up my command to Captain Paul Demeré," Raymond's brother.³³

Having been enlisted only to build the fort, the provincials were disbanded, but Raymond Demeré encouraged them to enlist in the regulars. Every man refused, and they were "all gone in a great hurry," probably to collect the £14,000 in back pay that awaited them.³⁴ Raymond Demeré left Fort Loudoun on August 19, 1757. He never saw his brother again.

The fort which Raymond Demeré left behind was an impressive one. There was DeBrahm's ditch planted with honey locusts, an ample parapet though not quite as high as DeBrahm intended, and a strong palisade. The Prince of Wales bastion had command of the river, but an attack from that quarter was unlikely because a few miles downriver the water was too shallow for large boats to pass. The fort was more vulnerable from the south where the "friendly" Indians lived. A man standing on the level south of the fort could, in theory, see and fire at the men at the crest of the hill who were defending the north wall, but in practice the cannon prevented anyone from getting close enough to do any damage. DeBrahm opposed having cannon at the fort, thinking them unnecessary, but it is hard to see how the fort would have been secure without them.³⁵

³² Demeré to Lyttelton, April 11, May 18, 1757, *CRSC*, 365-66, 375.

³³ Demeré to Lyttelton, July 30, August 10 and 18, 1757, *ibid.*, 396, 399, 404; Brown, *Old Frontiers*, 76.

³⁴ *SCCJ*, July 12, 1757, p. 69; Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, July 12, 1757, *SCPR*, I, 271; Davidson, *The Tennessee*, 111.

³⁵ Demeré to Lyttelton, December 27, 1756, *CRSC*, 289.

Inside the fort was a row of barracks, a workable drainage system, a powder magazine in the King George bastion, and a large blacksmith's shop which sometimes doubled as a chapel and council house, and in the early days as a guardhouse as well. There were also several storehouses and a number of temporary structures which later were taken down.³⁶

By November, 1757, Paul Demeré added two corn houses and a permanent guardroom with a double chimney that faced both ways. It consisted of two rooms, built at different times. Late in 1757 or early the next year, he built a house for himself, which measured about eighteen by forty-one feet. In 1759 he sent Lyttelton a plan for a high tower, such as DeBrahm had proposed in 1756, but the governor rejected it.³⁷

Life at Fort Loudoun conformed to military routine. In the Prince of Wales bastion the colors were raised every morning and lowered every evening. The drum beat out reveille, parade, and tattoo, and the troops turned out for frequent if unwelcome drills and inspections. The guard was changed several times a day. One of the last things done each night was to let the five large guard dogs out of the fort.³⁸

Less soldierly activities too, like planting and harvesting corn, hunting, fishing, and herding livestock occupied the men's time. As the 80,000 animal bones excavated at the fort attest, the two butchers kept very busy.³⁹ The stench of slaughter must have prevailed much of the time.

Although the garrison provided some of its own food, most of it came over a tenuous and irregular supply line from South Carolina.

³⁶ Demeré to Lyttelton, January 31, March 1, 1757, and Paul Demeré to Lyttelton, August 18, 1757, *CRSC*, 327, 345, 403. Hereinafter all references to Demeré are to Paul Demeré unless otherwise noted. For information about the configuration and dimensions of the fort and structures in the fort, I am indebted to Dr. Carl Kuttruff of the Tennessee Division of Archaeology, who supervised the excavation of Fort Loudoun in 1975-76, and who granted me several interviews in May and June, 1979.

³⁷ Demeré to Lyttelton, November 24, 1757, *CRSC*, 418. Elsworth Brown, "Archæology of Fort Loudoun: Field Investigations, 1956-1957," and the same for 1957-1958, 4, 24 (typescripts at the McClung Historical Collection, Knoxville); Lyttelton to Demeré, March 20, 1759, Lyttelton's Letter Book, 307. Hereinafter cited as LLB. A photocopy of one of two letter books of Governor Lyttelton is deposited at the South Carolina Archives. The original letter books were sold at Sotheby's in London on December 12, 1978. An elevation drawing of the proposed tower accompanies Demeré to Lyttelton, February 27, 1759, in the Lyttelton Papers Selected Correspondence (film) at the McClung Historical Collection, Knoxville.

³⁸ Demeré to Lyttelton, November 24, 1757, *CRSC*, 417.

³⁹ Interview with Carl Kuttruff, May-June, 1979. His findings will appear in published form in 1983. For earlier excavations, see Paul Kelley, "Fort Loudoun: The After Years, 1760-1960," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XX, no. 4 (Dec., 1961), 303-22.

In November, 1756, the men were spared from eating horseflesh only by Captain John Stuart's success in buying corn from the Indians.⁴⁰

When the Cherokee were not themselves in need, their women brought fish, wild fruits, and vegetables to the fort to barter for trade goods. Indian men came to the fort to have their guns and tools mended by the blacksmith, who had no time for any other work. When Paul Demeré arrived at Fort Loudoun, he commented on the large number of Cherokee who came to the fort every day.⁴¹

White women and children lived in the fort too. In August, 1760, there were sixty soldiers' dependents. During a visit to Charleston Attakullakulla told the Governor that the Cherokee women were "pleased and satisfied with their sisters the White women," who taught them many domestic skills, but the cultural flow was not all in one direction.⁴²

Occasional visitors like the Presbyterian divines John Martin, who preached at the fort in 1758, and William Richardson, who lived there for several months in 1759, added to the spiritual life of the garrison. Richardson kept a journal, recording that he preached to the soldiers from Luke 2:10-11, baptized one of the soldier's children, and "Went to the Fort . . . to talk at the grave of a soldier who died suddenly by a fall."⁴³

Despite the humdrum of military routine, Fort Loudoun bustled with activity, enlivened considerably by the Cherokee. The fort's commander in effect served as South Carolina's Indian agent and the British ambassador to the Cherokee. He had to pacify their fears, stop false rumors, and secure their loyalty with mountains of presents. The fort's cannon fired salutes to departing war parties, and greeted returning ones, especially those that brought French scalps.

⁴⁰ Orders of Captain Rayd. Demeré, November 28, 1756, and Raymond Demeré to Lyttelton, November 28, December 8, 1756, *CRSC*, 258-59, 264.

⁴¹ Talk by Raymond Demeré, October 23, 1756, and Paul Demeré to Lyttelton, August 18, 1757, *ibid.*, 222, 403.

⁴² Byrd to Abercrombie, September 16, 1760, C.O., 5/59, p. 34. I have used transcripts of these papers at the McClung Historical Collection, Knoxville, which hereinafter will be distinguished from Colonial Office papers elsewhere as (Knoxville transcripts); *SCCJ*, February 12, 1757, p. 56.

⁴³ Samuel C. Williams, "An Account of the Presbyterian Mission to the Cherokees, 1757-1759," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, Second Series, I (1931), 125-38. In Lyttelton to Demeré, May 5, 1758, LLB, 124, he writes "I desire you to give him [Rev. Thomas Martin] such a reception in the fort as the very laudable and pious work he is engaged in deserves." Rev. William Richardson's "An Account of my Proceedings since I accepted the Indian Mission on October 2nd, 1758," quoted in Samuel C. Williams, *Dawn of the Tennessee Valley and Tennessee History* (Johnson City, Tenn., 1937), 213, 221.

Dealing with the often fickle Cherokee was seldom dull. On one occasion, the staunchly pro-British Attakullakulla, when intoxicated, tried to break a bottle over Raymond Demeré's head. Attakullakulla and all the leading chiefs maintained a correspondence with the French, not unknown to the Demeré brothers, but relations with the Cherokee steadily improved after the fort's construction. So good, in fact, were Anglo-Cherokee relations that by the summer of 1758 nearly 700 Cherokee warriors were serving alongside the British at all fronts of the war. General John Forbes had 400 Cherokee with him during his successful campaign against Fort Duquesne, at the site of present-day Pittsburgh.⁴⁴ Ironically, it was this flourishing state in Anglo-Cherokee relations that set in motion the forces that destroyed Fort Loudoun.

Undisciplined Cherokee warriors going to and from the northern front stole horses, plundered houses, and frightened the backcountry settlers of Virginia. The settlers retaliated by killing a number of Cherokee. The Cherokee had a "law of blood" that required a life for a life from the countrymen of those who killed Cherokee.⁴⁵ One white's life was as good as another so the Cherokee took vengeance on British settlers in the Carolinas although those who killed the Cherokee were British settlers from Virginia.

The cycle of violence escalated. As the Cherokee became disenchanted with the British, they became more susceptible to the blandishments of the French. Angered by the murders, Governor Lyttelton imposed an embargo on arms and ammunition going into the Cherokee country. This effective measure caused Oconostota, the war leader of the entire Cherokee nation, to lead a party to Charleston to get the embargo lifted. When Oconostota's party arrived, Lyttelton had already decided to lead a punitive expedition against the Cherokee. Contrary to the assurances given to the Cherokee, Oconostota's party was taken

⁴⁴ Demeré to Lyttelton, July 21, 1756, and editor's introduction, *CRSC*, 147-48, xxix. For Forbes's expedition, see Alfred Porter Jones, *Writings of General John Forbes Relating to His Service in North America* (Menasha, Wis., 1938).

⁴⁵ Deposition Concerning Indian Disturbances in Virginia, *CRSC*, 463-70; Dobbs to Lyttelton, May 25, 1759, Lyttelton Papers (William Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.). For Cherokee law, John Philip Reid, "A Perilous Rule: The Law of International Homicide," in Duane H. King, ed., *The Cherokee Indian Nation: A Troubled History* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1979), 33-45.

hostage and forced to accompany Lyttelton's army, which arrived at Fort Prince George on December 9, 1759.⁴⁶

Attakullakulla, still friendly to the British, arrived at that fort and negotiated the release of Oconostota, but not his comrades. The two principal chiefs then signed a treaty with Lyttelton whereby the remaining hostages would be kept at Fort Prince George until exchanged for those Cherokee who had murdered the settlers. Attakullakulla was sincere, but Oconostota was merely biding his time. As soon as Lyttelton and his army returned to Charleston, Oconostota loosed a full-scale war on South Carolina's frontiers. At once Lyttelton appealed to General Jeffrey Amherst, commander-in-chief in North America, for troops. He also wrote to the governors of Virginia and North Carolina asking them to mount expeditions to relieve Fort Loudoun.⁴⁷

In October, 1759, Captain John Stuart, two lieutenants, and seventy provincials with large supplies of food and ammunition reinforced Demeré. By January 26, 1760, the fort had nearly four months' provisions, but there were nearly 300 mouths to feed including soldiers' dependents. The fort was cut off, but had not been fired upon. The only hostile act had been the attempt of Ostenaco to seize the fort's cattle the previous autumn. Demeré had foiled the attempt, driven the seventy cattle into the fort, slaughtered them, and salted the beef.⁴⁸

Peace still seemed possible, especially when Oconostota announced that he was returning to Fort Prince George to negotiate the release of the remaining hostages. Instead, he lured the fort's commander out of the fort and then signalled to twenty-five or thirty gunmen he had concealed beneath the river bank. The commander, Lieutenant Richard Coytmore, was mortally wounded. In hot fury the garrison responded by killing the twenty-three Cherokee hostages in the fort.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ SCCJ, 128-42; Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, September 1, 1759, SCPR, II, 331; *South Carolina Gazette*, October 20, November 1, 1759; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 178-86. For Oconostota, see James C. Kelly, "Oconostota," *Journal of Cherokee Studies*, III, no. 4 (Fall, 1978), 221-38.

⁴⁷ *South Carolina Gazette*, January 12, 1760; SCCJ, August 14, 1759, January 11, 1760; Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, February 22, 1760, SCPR, II, 388-92, 404, 419; Pearson to Lyttelton, February 8, 1760, CRSC, 495-96.

⁴⁸ Lyttelton to Lords of Trade, September 1, 1759, February 22, 1760, SCPR, II, 331, 419; Maurice Anderson to Richard Coytmore, September 12, 1759, SCPR, II, 349; Coytmore to Lyttelton, September 26, 1759, SCPR, II, 361. For Ostenaco, see E. Raymond Evans, "Ostenaco," *Journal of Cherokee Studies*, I, no. 1 (Summer, 1976), 41-54.

⁴⁹ Miln to Lyttelton, February 24, 1760, CRSC, 497-501; *South Carolina Gazette*, February 9, 16, 1760.

Oconostota, realizing that he had reached the point of no return, rushed back to the Overhills and laid Fort Loudoun under siege. Beginning on March 20, the Indians "fired upon it for four days successively, but at too far a distance to do any execution."⁵⁰ The cannon prevented the Indians from coming closer, so Oconostota adopted starvation as his tactic.

General Amherst responded to Lyttelton's appeal by sending Colonel Archibald Montgomery to Charleston with 1300 regulars. Joined by about 350 provincials, Montgomery marched against the Cherokee; but on June 10, 1760, he was ambushed by Oconostota in a narrow mountain pass near the town of Etchoe. Montgomery suffered only twenty-five killed and seventy wounded, but with the mountains looming ahead and no secure line of supply or communication behind, he retreated to Fort Prince George, then to Charleston, then to New York. With Governor Lyttelton having accepted the more lucrative post of Governor of Jamaica, Lieutenant-Governor William Bull was left to observe of Montgomery "that the Cherokee war was rather inflamed than extinguished by his vigorous attack upon, his devastation of, and early retreat from their towns."⁵¹

The news of Montgomery's retreat was a tremendous blow to the men at Fort Loudoun, but there was still hope of relief from Virginia because the Virginians, coming down the valley of the Holston River, had no mountains to cross. The Virginia troops, however, were not enlisted until June and they were placed under the command of the dilatory and diletantish William Byrd III, who built a fort every twenty-five miles and planned his major attack for 1761. In the bitter words of Indian trader James Adair, "The Virginia troops kept far off in flourishing parade, without coming to our assistance or making a diversion." North Carolina did not even appropriate funds for an

⁵⁰ Bull to Lords of Trade, May 6, 1760, SCPR, II, 431; *Maryland Gazette*, June 5, 1760; Williams, *Timberlake*, 13.

⁵¹ Philip Hamer, "Fort Loudoun in the Cherokee War, 1758-1761," *North Carolina Historical Review*, II (1925), 451-52; Montgomery to Amherst, July 2, 1760, British Public Record Office, War Office (hereinafter cited as W.O.), 34/47 (Library of Congress transcripts); Bull to Lords of Trade, July 20, 1760, SCPR, II, 373-80. *The Gentleman's Magazine*, XXX (August, 1760), 393, says there were 140 casualties, but the smaller sum has more corroboration. The fullest account of Montgomery's expedition is in Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 207-15.

expedition until June and then her governor, seeing that it was too late, vetoed the bill.⁵²

In the middle of May Demeré reduced the rations to one quart of corn per day per man. Only a month's provisions remained, but Attakullakulla and those Indian women with husbands in Fort Loudoun prolonged the siege by slipping "pumpkins and Fowles, corn and hogs into the fort." Bull sent "two bold fellows" from South Carolina with "Packetts of Gay Ribbons, and Paint" which were traded to friendly Indians for two weeks' provisions.⁵³

Attakullakulla visited the fort nearly every day of the siege. He was Demeré's principal source of information, and twice he betrayed Oconostota's plans for taking the fort. Finally Attakullakulla was expelled from the Cherokee Council, branded an "Englishman," and forced to take his family to live in the woods. After June 5 no more food or information reached the fort.⁵⁴

On June 10 the ration was slashed to one quart of corn per day for three men. The last bread was consumed on July 7. Thereafter the people in the fort ate four ounces of horseflesh a day, plus a few beans, and some plums from bushes mistakenly planted in the ditch around the fort. By August 1 only eight horses remained. The garrison was "miserable beyond description," and felt "abandoned and forsaken by God and Man."⁵⁵


On the night of August 4 many men deserted, and the next day the rest threatened to abandon their officers and take to the woods. Demeré

⁵² Governor Fauquier of Virginia denied receiving Lyttelton's letter of October 1, 1759, which is in LLB, 423. Nor did a second appeal, received in February, 1760, produce any effect. A third, early in May, prompted a vote to raise 700 men and £32,000 to march one year's supplies to Fort Loudoun. Minutes of the Virginia Council, February 21, 1760, C.O., 5/1429 (Library of Congress transcripts); H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Journal of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1758-61* (Richmond, Va., 1908), 173-79. For Byrd's expedition, Minutes of the Virginia Council, May 24, July 8 and 23, 1760, C.O., 5/1435 (Library of Congress transcripts). Adair's quote is in Samuel C. Williams, ed., *Adair's History of the American Indians* (Johnson City, Tenn., 1930, from the original London, 1775 edition), 267-68. For Dobbs's veto, *North Carolina Colonial Records* (30 vols., Raleigh, 1886-1907), VI, 437-38. Hereinafter cited as NCCR.

⁵³ Bull to Lords of Trade, May 6, 1760, SCPR, II, 431-32; *South Carolina Gazette*, May 3, 1760; Williams, *Timberlake*, 89-90; Stuart to Lyttelton, July 11, November 22, 1760, Lyttelton Papers (William Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.); Bull to Dobbs, May 31, 1760, NCCR, VI, 261.

⁵⁴ *South Carolina Gazette*, May 3, 1760; Brown, *Old Frontiers*, 96; *Maryland Gazette*, July 31, 1760; Williams, *Dawn*, 241; Hamer, "Fort Loudoun," 453; Bull to Lords of Trade, May 6, June 30, 1760, SCPR, II, 441-42, 456.

⁵⁵ Byrd to Abercrombie, September 16, 1760, C.O., 5/59, p. 33 (Knoxville transcripts); Bull to Lords of Trade, June 30, 1760, SCPR, II, 457; *South Carolina Gazette*, August 13, 1760, in SCPR, II, 477, 482.



John Stuart was the only officer to survive the Fort Loudon massacre. He executed this map sometime afterward. Note the "Road by which Captain Stuart escaped to Virginia." *The British Library, Add. Mss. 14036.E*

called a council of war which determined that it was "impracticable to maintain the fort any longer." Paul Demeré was unpopular with the Cherokee, unlike his brother, so Captain Stuart handled the negotiations. The Cherokee agreed to let the inhabitants of the fort march to Virginia or South Carolina unmolested. The Indians would furnish a hunting party to provide fresh meat during the march. The garrison could take such arms and ammunition as they needed for the march. The fort, its cannon, powder, ball, and spare arms were to be delivered up to the Cherokee.⁵⁶

The troops staged a final parade on August 8 and lowered the colors for the last time. Early the next morning, 180 men and sixty women and children⁵⁷ set out for Fort Prince George, 140 miles away. After a day's march they encamped in a meadow where Cane Creek flows into the Tellico River. Ominously, their Cherokee escort slipped away into the woods during the night.

The next morning, as the camp was first stirring, a volley flashed from the woods wounding Captain Demeré. Demeré's companions returned the fire, whereupon 700 Cherokee raised a blood-curdling war whoop and "volleys of small arms with showers of arrows poured in upon" the British. Seeing the futility of resistance, most of the British laid down their arms, but three officers, twenty-three privates, and three women died in the exchange. Not surprisingly the number approximated the number of Cherokee hostages killed at Fort Prince George.⁵⁸

The wounded Demeré suffered an appalling death. He was scalped alive, made to dance for his captors, his mouth stuffed with dirt, and his arms and legs successively cut off. When death released him from his agony Ostenaco called out "Stop your hands! We have got the man we want." Of the officers only Captain Stuart survived. Whisked

⁵⁶ *South Carolina Gazette*, August 23, 1760, in SCPR, II, 480-82. Captain George Mercer to George Washington, November 2, 1757, in Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed., *Letters to Washington and Accompanying Papers* (5 vols., Boston, 1898-1902), II, 227, ridicules Paul Demeré as a proper person to manage Indians. In Lyttelton to Demeré, May 2, 1759, LLB, 341, the governor says of Attakullakulla "he seems to think you are not so attentive to the Indians and so kind to them as your Brother was."

⁵⁷ Byrd to Abercrombie, September 16, 1760, C.O., 5/59, p. 34 (Knoxville transcripts).

⁵⁸ *South Carolina Gazette*, September 6 and 20, October 18, 1760, in SCPR, II, 494, 500, 506-07, 525; Bull to Lords of Trade, September 9, 1760, SCPR, II, 497, reports the death of Demeré and twenty-three privates, "being particular in that number, as being the amount of Hostages detained by Governor Lyttelton last December." The actual number of fatalities is disputed.

away by Onatoy, he was ransomed by Attakullakulla, who then escaped with him to Virginia.⁵⁹

The scalps of the fallen were beaten in the faces of the survivors as they were marched to the various Cherokee towns. One Luke Croft was tortured, burned at the stake, and his head and right hand set on a pole in the chungke yard.⁶⁰ A few shared his fate, but most lived to be ransomed to Virginia or South Carolina.

News of Fort Loudoun's fall was speeded to Fort Toulouse, then to New Orleans, and on to Paris by means of a coded message. A French expedition to occupy the fort was stopped by the Suck of the Tennessee River near present-day Chattanooga.⁶¹

General Amherst, who learned of the surrender from Bull, was "ashamed, for I believe it is the first instance of His Majesty's Troops having yielded to the Indians." He despatched yet another army to Charleston. It was commanded by Colonel James Grant, who had learned from Montgomery's mistakes. His tactics prevented an ambush and, in his own words, he "burned fifteen towns, fifteen hundred acres of corn, and drove five thousand Cherokees into the mountains to starve." In December, 1761, Attakullakulla, whom the Cherokee recalled to power to end the war he had opposed, arranged a peace. He supervised the return of the Fort Loudoun captives, but the last twenty or thirty, which included eleven or twelve children, were not returned until the summer of 1762.⁶²

Lieutenant Henry Timberlake, who visited the Overhills in 1762 and kept a journal, noted but did not describe the "ruins" of Fort

⁵⁹ *South Carolina Gazette*, October 4, 1760, and SCCJ, October 22, 1760, in SCPR, II, 517, 539; Byrd to Abercrombie, September 16, 1760, C.O., 5/59, p. 36 (Knoxville transcripts); *Maryland Gazette*, September 11, 1760.

⁶⁰ *South Carolina Gazette*, October 18, 1760, in SCPR, II, 526.

⁶¹ Brown, *Old Frontiers*, 105-06; Williams, *Dawn*, 178. In Williams, *Adair*, 287, Adair writes of the French expedition: "They soon sent off a large pettiangre sufficiently laden with warlike stores and decoying presents; and in obedience to the orders they had received of making all the dispatch they could, in the third moon of their departure from New Orleans they arrived within a hundred and twenty computed miles of those towns that are a little above the unhappy Fort Loudoun and they were luckily stopped in their mischievous career, by a deep and dangerous cataract, the waters of which rolled down with prodigious rapidity, and dashed against the opposite rocks, and from thence rushed off with impetuous violence, on a quarter-angled course. It appeared so shocking and insurmountable to the monsieurs, that after staying there a considerable time, in the vain expectation of seeing some of their friends, necessity forced them to return back to New Orleans, about 2600 computed miles, to their inconsolable disappointment."

⁶² Amherst to Bull, October 14, 1760, C.O., 5/59, pp. 25-26 (Knoxville transcripts); Lt. Col. James Grant, "Military Journal, June-July, 1761," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XII (1933), 35; *Maryland Gazette*, April 30, May 21, 1761; *South Carolina Gazette*, June 20, 1761, June 19, July 3 and 10, 1762; Corkran, *Cherokee Frontier*, 271; Hamer, "Fort Loudoun," *NCHR*, II, 457.

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Loudoun. It is unknown if the Cherokee destroyed it, or if it merely fell into ruin through disrepair. In 1797 Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans and later Citizen King of France, crossed the Little Tennessee River "and went first to the site of Fort Loudoun, which is buried in brush now, with only a little rubble and a few irregularities of terrain to mark the fort's existence."⁶³

Fort Loudoun's existence was indeed brief, but it fulfilled its purpose. During the early years of the French and Indian War, when the French were everywhere victorious, the fort kept the powerful Cherokee nation from joining the French. In 1756 Raymond Demeré wrote that if the Cherokee joined the French, the Creek would also, and with the Choctaw already supporting the French, every major Indian tribe would follow suit.⁶⁴ That might very well have changed the outcome of the war in North America. When the Cherokee did turn against the British it was too late to affect the outcome of the larger struggle. Montreal, the last French stronghold, surrendered within a few weeks of Fort Loudoun. The short, turbulent life of Fort Loudoun helped to determine that the Tennessee country and the rest of the trans-Appalachian west would not be French, but would belong to the British, and to their successors, the Americans.

⁶³ Williams, *Timberlake*, 57; *Diary of My Travels in America*: [By] Louis Philippe, King of France, 1830-1848, translated by Stephen Becker (New York, 1977), 83. Other references to Fort Loudoun in later years are "Journal of Benjamin Hawkins" for March 31, 1797, and "Report of Abraham Steiner and Frederick C. DeSchweinitz," 1799, in Williams, *Early Travels*, 372, 470. If not already destroyed by the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun may have been destroyed by the British in 1763. See Egremont to Dobbs, March 16, 1763, *NCCR*, VI, 975.

⁶⁴ Demeré to Lyttelton, November 18, 1756, *CRSC*, 249.